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Most cases of cancer result from exposure to man-made chemicals
in the environment.' These cancers are torts, injuries inflicted by
one person on another. Nevertheless, cancer victims nearly always fail
to recover damages in tort because they are unable to meet tradi-
tional standards of proof. Cancer symptoms are usually latent for many
years after exposure to carcinogens, and therefore it is often difficult
for victims to assemble evidence of the tortious exposure. Further-
more, limited scientific understanding of the etiology2 of cancer makes
it almost impossible to establish proximate cause.
In the absence of an effective tort remedy, current strategies in the
war on cancer inadequately serve the important objectives of cancer
prevention and victim compensation. In order to enhance the ef-
fectiveness of the tort mechanism, this Note proposes that state leg-
islatures adopt a catalog of carcinogenic substances to facilitate proof
of proximate cause in cancer tort suits. If a cancer victim shows that
she was exposed by the defendant to a threshold quantity of a sub-
stance listed in the catalog, the burden would shift to the defendant
to show that he should not be held liable. The proximate cause re-
quirements would then serve the functional objective of deterring
carcinogen production and reducing future cancer incidence. In ad-
dition to strengthening the tort remedy, this proposal would com-
plement current efforts to control the cancer epidemic through gov-
ernmental regulation and medical research.
I. Current Approaches and Their Limitations
It is now widely accepted in the scientific community that be-
tween sixty and ninety percent of all cancers result from exposure
1. See P. BARTH & H. HuNT, WORKEaS' COMPENSATION AND WORK-RELATED ILLNESSES
AND DISEASES 84 (1980) (85% to 90% of all cancers due to environmental phenomena);
Doniger, Federal Regulation of Vinyl Chloride; A Short Course in the Law and Policy of
Toxic Substances Control, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 497, 509 (1978) (60% to 90% of all cancers caused
by exposure to chemical substances in environment).
2. The etiology of a disease is the "group of conditions which form [its] cause." W.
THOMPSON, BLACK's MEDiCAL DICTIONARY 331 (32d ed. 1979).
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to factors introduced into the environment by man.3 The incidence
of cancer therefore can be lessened substantially by reducing the ex-
posure of human beings to carcinogenic substances. 4 Nevertheless,
the current strategies in the war on cancer 5-government regulation,
medical research, and private tort actions-fail to achieve this goal.
A. Regulation of Carcinogenic Substances
The primary strategy for controlling human exposure to carcino-
gens is government regulation of the production, use, and disposal of
such substances. Six major federal agencies, empowered by fifteen
separate statutes, regulate carcinogenic and toxic substances.6 These
3. P. BARTH & H. HUNT, supra note 1, at 84; Doniger, supra note I, at 509.
4. Doniger, supra note I, at 510; see Cairns, The Cancer Problem, SCIENTIFIC AM., Nov.
1975, at 64, 64 ("[Blecause we can act to alter the environment, those cancers are po-
tentially avoidable.!)
5. The current effort to eradicate cancer has many of the features of a crusade. See
7 W.EKLY CoMP. OF PREs. Doc. 89, 92 (Jan. 25, 1971) (President Nixon's State of Union
Message calling for intensive campaign, comparable to atomic bomb or moon projects,
aimed at "conquering this dread disease"). The bills that eventually passed as the 1971
National Cancer Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 281-286g (1976), were known as the Conquest of Cancer
Bill, S. 1828, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971), and the National Cancer Attack Bill, H.R. 11302,
92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
6. The six agencies and their empowering statutes are: (1) the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, which exercises regulatory authority over two million work-
places and 75% of the workforce, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979); see S.
Essmmi, THE POLITICS OF CANCER 371 (1979); (2) the Environmental Protection Agency,
which regulates carcinogens under six statutes: the Federal Environmental Pesticide Con-
trol Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1976), the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-
2629 (1976), the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979), the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-10 (1976 & Supp.
III 1979), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987
(1976 & Supp. I1 1979), and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. InI 1979); (3)
the Consumer Product Safety Commission, established by the Consumer Product Safety
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1976), to exercise authority over 10,000 consumer products,
including those covered by the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-
1274 (1976); (4) the Food and Drug Administration, exercising authority under the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979); (5) the
Department of Agriculture, exercising limited authority to control carcinogens in agri-
cultural products and meat under the 1906 Federal Meat Inspection Act and the 1967
Wholesome Meat Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979); and (6) the Depart-
ment of Transportation, which regulates the handling and transportation of carcinogenic
substances under the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 421-441 (1976 & Supp.
I 1979), the Dangerous Cargo Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 170-170b (1976), the Ports and Water-
ways Safety Act, 46 U.S.C. § 391(a) (1976 & Supp. II 1979), and the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812 (1976 & Supp. Il 1979).
Several other agencies have lesser responsibilities for regulating carcinogens: the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, under the 1964 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1976); the Bureau of Mines, under the Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979), and the Federal
Metal and Non-Metallic Mine Safety Act of 1966, 30 U.S.C. §§ 721-740 (1976); and the
Mine Enforcement Safety Administration, under the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Amendments Act of 1977, 29 U.S.C. § 557a, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-959 (1976 & Supp. HI 1979).
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agencies and their supporting statutory schemes all seek to control en-
vironmental carcinogenesis by enforcing specific deterrence measures.7
Some statutes, called "no-risk" measures, prohibit any human ex-
posure to specified carcinogenic substances." This type of regulation
reflects a collective decision that these carcinogens are to be eliminated
from the environment at all costs.9 Other statutes, however, estab-
lish a more complex regulatory calculus. They require agencies to
evaluate, on a cost-benefit basis, the net social effects of regulating
a carcinogenic substance' or of imposing a particular level of regu-
7. "Specific or collective deterrence" refers to accident cost reduction measures adopted
through the political process. See G. CALABRESI, THE CosTs oF ACCIDENTS 68 (1970) (specific
deterrence "involves deciding collectively the degree to which we want any given ac-
tivity, who should participate in it, and how we want it done"). "General deterrence,"
by contrast, refers to methods for deciding
what the accident costs of activities are and letting the market determine the degree
to which . . . activities are desired given such costs . . . . [I]t involves giving people
freedom to choose whether they would rather engage in the activity and pay the
costs of doing so, including accident costs, or, given the accident costs, engage in
safer activities that might otherwise have seemed less desirable.
Id. at 69. This Note uses these terms to refer to methods for controlling all externalities
of economic actors, not simply their accident costs.
8. See, e.g., Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1976) (prohibiting
certification for safe use of any food additive found to induce cancer when ingested by
humans or animals-the Delaney Clause); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (Supp. III
1979) (prohibiting air pollution that may reasonably be expected to result in increase
in mortality or serious illness). See generally Kraus, Environmental Carcinogenesis: Regu-
lation on the Frontiers of Science, 7 ENvr'L L. 83, 124-26 (1976) (discussing Delaney
Clause); Leape, Quantitative Risk Assessment in Regulation of Environmental Carcino-
gens, 4 HARV. ENVT'L L REv. 86, 106-07 (1980) (discussing no-risk or "health only" statu-
tory provisions and agency responses to these mandates).
9. For example, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, § 307(a), 33 US.C. § 1317(a)
(1976), until its amendment in 1977, barred the Environmental Protection Agency from
considering economic factors in regulating toxic water pollutants. See H.R. REP. No. 911,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1972) ("The committee considers that the discharge of toxic
pollutants are [sic] much too dangerous to be permitted on merely economic grounds.");
cf. G. CALABREsi, supra note 7, at 100-02 (specific deterrence is often used to control
injurious activity when strong moral values are at stake); Leape, supra note 8, at 88
& n.7 (cost-benefit analysis is objective and therefore amoral, but consumers, labor, and
environmental groups are concerned about health risks grounded in moral considerations).
10. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., Inc., 100 S. Ct. 2844,
2863 (1980) (Occupational Safety and Health Act requires Administrator to conduct cost-
benefit evaluation as to whether standard is "reasonably necessary and appropriate to
remedy a significant risk of material health impairment" before promulgating regula-
tions for toxic materials in workplace); Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 136(bb), 136a(c)(5)(C)-(D) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (prohibiting sale of pesticides
that pose "any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the
economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide"). See
generally Comment, Cost-Benefit Analysis for Standards Regulating Toxic Substances
Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act: American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA,
60 B.U. L. Rv. 115 (1980) (discussing possible formulations of cost-benefit analyses re-
quired by American Petroleum Inst. v. Occupational Safety & Health Administration, 581
F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978)).
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Iation. 11 The resulting regulations attempt to approximate the effi-
cient resource allocation that would result if the costs of producing
carcinogens were directly accounted for in the production decisions
of each producer. 12
Although regulation has removed several carcinogens from the en-
vironment,13 the effect on overall exposure to carcinogens has been
insignificant.1 4 As with all specific deterrence measures, enforcement
I1. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 US.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976) (requiring
that health be protected "to the extent feasible"). The Toxic Substances Control Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976), makes the parameters of the required cost-benefit calcu-
lation explicit. In promulgating regulations, the Administrator must consider:
(A) the effects of such substance or mixture on health ....
(B) the effects of such substance or mixture on the environment ....
(C) the benefits of such substance or mixture for various uses and the avail-
ability of substitutes for such uses, and
(D) the reasonably ascertainable economic consequences of the rule, after con-
sideration of the effect on the national economy, small business, technological
innovation, the environment, and public health.
rd. § 2605(c).
12. Absent regulation, the social costs of producing and using carcinogenic substances
are not accounted for in the production decisions of producers because the costs of the
production's adverse impact on health are borne by cancer victims rather than carcinogen
producers. In economic terms, production of carcinogens results in an externality, that
is, a divergence between the private costs and the social costs of carcinogen production.
See Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & EcON. 141, 141 (1979). The presence
of an externality reflects the existence of a market failure, in this case the improper
pricing of the adverse effect on health and safety that is caused by production. Cost-
benefit regulations limit a producer's consumption of society's good health to the amount
that would be consumed if the right to damage health were appropriately priced.
In cost-benefit analysis, the value of the incremental health benefits resulting from a
particular level of regulation is weighed against the costs of implementing the regulation.
See, e.g., Leape, supra note 8, at 106 (balancing statutes weigh risks posed by chemical
to be regulated and compliance costs imposed by regulation). If, however, the externality
is generated by an existing plant, even an accurate cost-benefit calculation will not
necessarily lead to the socially optimal resource allocation. There is no necessary rela-
tionship between the costs of complying with the regulation and the magnitude of the
existing externality. The total social cost of the existing plant's operation, measured by
the total adverse health impact, may greatly exceed the plant's social benefit even though
the regulation is set so that the compliance costs equal the marginal health benefits.
Thus, a substantial externality may remain after complete implementation of the cost-
benefit regulation.
13. See, e.g., S. FBsraiN, supra note 6, at 400-01 (Delaney Clause has been used to ban
Flectol H and MOCA from food packaging, and dulcin, coumarin, safrole, oil of calamus,
cyclamate, diethylpyrocarbonate, DES, mercaptoimidazoline, and various dyes as food ad-
ditives); Doniger, supra note 1, at 526 (regulation or threat of regulation has forced vinyl
chloride industry to reduce workplace airborne concentrations drastically, to reduce emis-
sion outside plant by 95%, and to reduce residual content of vinyl chloride in food
packaging).
14. For case histories illustrating the failure of regulatory efforts, see S. FsTEIN,
supra note 6, at 76-150 (workers developing cancer as result of regular occupational ex-
posure to asbestos, benzene, and vinyl chloride), id. at 151-240 (consumers developing
cancer as result of regular exposure to carcinogenic cosmetic dyes, saccharin, and estrogens
used as food additives), and id. at 241-98 (cancers developing as result of nitrosamines
and carcinogenic pesticides that pervade environment).
Compare NATIONAL INSTIUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, SUSPECrE CAt-
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of both no-risk and cost-benefit measures is expensive.15 Cost-benefit
regulatory schemes in particular entail the additional burden of de-
termining the socially optimal level of regulation. 16 Moreover, pro-
ducers have no incentive, other than the uncertain threat of token
sanctions, to incur the costs of complying with the regulations
17
As a result, these regulatory measures commonly generate lengthy
CINOGENS at ix (2d ed. 1976) (more than 2,400 chemicals have been implicated as carcino-
gens) with S. EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 536-40 app. III (approximately 50 carcinogens are
subject to regulation).
15. For example, in 1972, government expenditures for pollution control regulation and
monitoring were estimated at $351 million, and an additional $306 million was expended
in pollution-related governmental research. By 1975, expenditures under these two pro-
grams approached $1 billion. See U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY: SIxTH ANNUAL REPORT 526, 530 (1975) [hereinafter cited as CEQ AN-
NUAL REPORT].
16. "Cost-benefit" approaches require a method for comparing the complex health
and economic consequences of proposed regulations. Assessing the health consequences
of a particular level of regulation requires an estimation of the number of cases of
cancer that would be prevented by the regulation and a valuation of the social bene-
fits of preventing those cancers. Both steps in the analysis are likely to understate
the magnitude of health benefits. See S. EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 412-15 (quantita-
tive risk assessment is premature science employing economically simplistic terms); cf.
Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L
REv. 1329, 1361-65 (1971) (quantitative approaches to policy determinations will tend to
understate importance of variables of high degrees of uncertainty in favor of more cer-
tain, though perhaps less significant, variables). On the other hand, costs incurred by
industry are not likely to be understated because these costs are immediate, subject to
relatively certain calculation, and fall upon highly vocal, influential, and cohesive sub-
populations. See Doniger, supra note 1, at 516-18 (business incentives to exaggerate dif-
ficulties and costs of regulation combined with emphasis on short-term "dislocation costs"
of regulation lead to overestimation of economic impact); Karstadt, Protecting Public
Health From Hazardous Substances: Federal Regulation of Environmental Contaminants,
5 ENVT'L L. REP. 50,165, 50,172 (1975) (industry may respond to impending large regula-
tory costs by closing or threatening to close plants).
Even given an adequate determination of the costs involved, any .approximation of
the efficient resource allocation solution is, at best, a static optimum. Given technological
change and advances in medical treatment, the information costs of maintaining socially
efficient regulations are necessarily ongoing. See B. ACKERMAN, S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, J.
SAwYER, & D. HENDERSON, THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 246-48
(1974) (economic changes necessitate continual adjustment of pollution regulations); Spence
& Weitzman, Regulatory Strategies for Pollution Control, in APPROACHES TO CONTROLLING
AIR POLLUTION 202-03 (A. Friedlaender ed. 1978) (friction in adjusting to regulations makes
dynamic regulatory process costly, time consuming, and perhaps infeasible).
17. See F. ANDERSON, A. KNEESE, P. REED, R. STEVENSON, & S. TAYLOR, ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 12-18 (1977) (analysis of inadequate incen-
tives for producers to comply with regulations) [hereinafter cited as F. ANDERSON]; R.
STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 558 (2d ed. 1978) ("[Traditional
sanctions often fail to secure prompt compliance with environmental controls because of
limited enforcement resources; the reliance on lengthy and expensive court procedures; the
economic incentives for polluter delay; and the reluctance of judges to impose draconian
sanctions."); cf. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Acts to Eliminate Economic Advan-
tage of Ignoring Clean Air Laws, ENVIRONMENT NEws, Sept. 1980, at 10 ("[E]conomic
savings resulting from noncompliance have encouraged environmental footdragging by
violating industries.') (quoting EPA Administrator Douglas M. Costle).
844
Vol. 90: 840, 1981
Cancer Tort Law
enforcement proceedings, sustained resistance, and very little compli-
ance by the regulated industries.1 s
B. Cancer Research
The second major front in the war on cancer is an extremely ex-
pensive research program.19 This program adopts the traditional med-
ical approach to fighting disease: it seeks a cure through basic scien-
tific research and develops methods of treating existing cancer victims. 20
Although this strategy had some success in reducing the number of can-
cer fatalities between the mid-1930s and the mid-1950s, 21 the death rate
has been virtually static since 1955.22 The incidence of cancer, more-
over, has continued to rise.23 Thus, the narrow focus of current research
programs shows little prospect of long-term cancer prevention.24
18. See J. EsPosrro, VANISHING AIR 114-18 (1970) (describing futile attempts by au-
thorities over 14-year period to close small rendering plant in Maryland); S. EPSTEIN,
supra note 6, at 137-50 (describing industry resistance to attempts by Occupational Safety
and Health Administration to revise standards for benzene exposure in workplace).
The complexity of environmental laws contributes to enforcement problems. See Speech
by Rick Middleton, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, at Yale Law School (Sept. 22, 1980)
("When you consider the complexity of these enforcement procedures [under the Clean
Air Act], it's a miracle there's any compliance at all.') (notes on file with Yale Law
Journal). Implementation and enforcement consists of three basic steps: translating gen-
eral requirements into enforceable standards for individual sources, monitoring regu-
latees' conduct, and applying sanctions or other incentives to correct noncompliance and
to prevent future violations. R. STEWART & J. KRIER, supra note 17, at 536. "Each of these
steps involves potentials for slippage or failure that can gravely impair the ultimate
efficacy of regulatory controls... Id.
19. Congressional appropriations for the National Cancer Institute almost quadrupled
between 1971 and 1977, increasing from $233 million to $815 million. R. RETIG, CANCER
CRUSADE 298-99 (1977). This massive funding produced "the largest, most extensive planning
effort ever undertaken within biomedical research." Id. at 299.
20. See CEQ ANNUAL REPORT, suPra note 15, at 34 (most effort has been directed to-
ward cancer treatment and cure rather than prevention). In general, Americans spend
more on treating diseases than preventing them. See S. EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 322 (of
$48 billion spent on health care in 1978, 96% was allocated for treatment, 4% for
prevention).
21. S. EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 8 (in mid-1930s, approximately one in five cancer pa-
tients survived for five years after diagnosis; by mid-1950s, five-year survival rate was one
in three). Epstein reports that general advances in surgical and post-operative techniques,
rather than improved medical techniques in treating cancer, were primarily responsible
for the reduced mortality. Id. at 8-10.
22. Id. at 8-11. Since 1955, the five-year survival rates for relatively rare cancers such
as Hodgkin's disease and acute lymphocytic leukemia in children have increased dramati-
cally. Nevertheless, survival rates for the major cancer killers-lung, breast, and colon
cancer-have not experienced significant improvement. Id.; see NATIONAL INSTrES OF
HEALTH, CANCER PATIENT SURvIVAL 6-7, 62, 138, 157 (1976) (comparing survival trends for
various cancers and discussing trends for colon, lung, and breast cancers).
23. See Devesa & Schneiderman, Increase in the Number of Cancer Deaths in the
United States, 106 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1, 1-5 (1977) (risk of developing cancer increased
for every age group). Cancer is the only major killing disease whose incidence is rising.
S. EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 11.
24. A research program aimed at controlling cancer should not be limited to the
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C. The Tort System
Through the tort system, individual cancer victims, or their heirs,
seek compensation from whoever they believe is responsible for their
cancer. The defendant may be the plaintiff's current or former em-
ployer or employers,25 the manufacturer or supplier of a drug or other
product,26 or a polluter.27
A major objective of the tort system is to adjust "the conflicting
claims of the litigating parties" 28 and to compensate injured parties
in a way that is just and fair.29 The tort system also promotes eco-
traditional goal of finding a cure. See CEQ ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 36-39
(modesty of improvements in cancer therapy effectiveness makes clear that increased em-
phasis on prevention is only prudent national cancer policy); R. Moss, THE CANCER
SYNDROME 215-36 (1980) (describing obstacles to cancer prevention posed by current re-
search policy). Scientists should also attempt to identify environmental carcinogens and
the circumstances in which individuals are exposed to these substances. Such a compre-
hensive research program would offer a real prospect of long-term cancer prevention.
Moreover, prevention of environmental carcinogenesis would be more efficient-and more
humane-than merely treating and curing cancer victims. See Schneiderman, Sources,
Resources, and Tsouris, in PERSONS AT HIGH RISK OF CANCER 459 (J. Fraumeni ed. 1975)
(prevention of cancer by simple public health methods is much more economical use of
resources).
25. See, e.g., Climax Uranium Co. v. Death of Smith, 33 Colo. App. 337, 522 P2d 134
(1974); Garner v. Hecla Mining Co., 19 Utah 2d 367, 431 P.2d 794 (1967). Alternatively,
the defendant may be a party who is liable for the employer's action. See, e.g., Mahoney
v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Tenn. 1963) (principal of employer); Parker v.
Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 440 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1969) (employer's insurer). Or the
defendant may be a party responsible for adjudicating claims for compensation. See, eg.,
Clark v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 155 W. Va. 726, 187 S.E.2d 213 (1972).
26. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980) (manufacturer of DES); Louisville Trust Co. v.
Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1979) (manufacturer of asbestos products).
27. See, e.g., Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961
(1979) (United States government testing of atomic bomb); In re Three Mile Island Liti-
gation, No. 79-0432 (M.D. Pa. July 10, 1980) (utility that owned plant involved in Three
Mile Island incident).
28. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 15 (4th ed. 1971).
29. In Professor Calabresi's formulation, the tort system has two principal goals: it
must reduce accident costs, and it must be just or fair. G. CALABRESI, supra note 7, at 24.
Calabresi declines to make a positive formulation of the "justice" goal. He evaluates
particular proposals according to whether they comport with a general sense of fairness
or are likely to create specific instances of injustice beyond those of current systems. Id.
at 24-26.
In contrast to Calabresi's predominantly utilitarian approach, Professor Fletcher would
have the tort system enforce a more explicitly moralistic standard of behavior. See Fletcher,
Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1972). Fletcher separates the
question of whether the victim was entitled to compensation from the determination of
whether it is fair to hold the defendant liable, and allows recovery from the defendant
if the victim was injured by "non-reciprocal risks" created by the defendant's activities.
Id. at 542.
Although this Note relies primarily on instrumental or utilitarian policy arguments
to justify the imposition of liability, the moralistic approach of Professor Fletcher's
"paradigm of reciprocity" provides a useful articulation of the justice goal of the tort
system in the cancer context. The paradigm is based on a
principle of fairness: all individuals in society have the right to roughly the same
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nomic efficiency by requiring a defendant to internalize the costs of
injuries caused by his activities.30 A defendant who is forced to bear
all the costs of his activities will, if behaving rationally, engage in
those activities only to the extent that the economic benefits equal
or outweigh the total costs.31
Although cancer resulting from exposure to man-made carcinogens
is a tort, few cancer victims have brought successful tort suits.32 As
a result, a large percentage of the costs of cancer treatment is borne
by victims and their families.3 3 The tort system's compensation goal is
therefore not being met. Moreover, because employers, manufactur-
ers, and polluters are not required to bear the full costs of produc-
tion, they operate in an economically inefficient and socially harmful
manner.
II. The Effects of Limited Scientific Knowledge
on Tort Suits for Cancer
The ability of scientists to describe carcinogenesis is restricted to
certain statistical statements about the relationship between cancer in-
cidence and exposure to suspected carcinogens. Despite the emergence
degree of security from risk. By analogy to John Rawls' first principle of justice,
the principle might read: we all have the right to the maximum amount of security
compatible with a like security for everyone else. This means that we are subject
to harm, without compensation, from background risks, but that no one may suffer
harm from additional risks without recourse for damages against the risk-creator.
Id. at 550 (footnote omitted). Scientists can describe cancer causation only in terms of
the creation of additional risk above the background level. The paradigm of reciprocity
justifies compensation for cancers that result from this additional risk. See pp. 855-59
infra (cancer victims should recover damages from defendant who exposed them to car-
cinogen that at least doubled risk of contracting cancer).
30. In the tort system, decentralized judgments by economic actors, considering ac-
cident costs as one of the many costs faced in choosing among different courses of action,
minimize the sum of accident and accident prevention costs, thus contributing to economic
efficiency. See Calabresi, Ottimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656, 656 (1975).
In the aggregate, the decisions of these economic actors result in optimal resource allo-
cations if costs are accurately reflected in the decision processes. See G. CALABRESI, supra
note 7, at 69-70.
31. See G. CALABsr, sut'ra note 7, at 73 (if costs of accidents are properly reflected
in accident-causing activity, actors will shift to safer and less costly activities or make
activities safer).
32. See, e.g., Mahoney v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 823, 841 (E.D. Tenn. 1963) ("Plain-
tiffs' exposures were well below the marginal limits for human safety.'); Garner v.
Hecla Mining Co., 19 Utah 2d 367, 371, 431 P.2d 794, 797 (1967) (citing statistical nature
of plaintiff's case and "well known but unfortunate uncertainty as to the cause of can-
cer'). See generally S. EPSTIN, supra note 6, at 502-08 (describing cancer victims' difficulty
in obtaining appropriate judgment or settlement).
33. In 1977, the direct cost of medical treatment for an individual with cancer averaged
$20,000, not including indirect costs to the victim's family in the form of lost earnings. S.
EpSTrIN, supra note 6, at 5. Nationally, total direct and indirect costs of cancer in 1978
were $30 billion. Id. at 5-8.
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of a scientific consensus on the descriptive and predictive strengths
of these mathematical relationships, the courts have been reluctant to
adapt tort requirements for proof of causation to accommodate evi-
dence accepted by scientists as demonstrating cancer causation.
A. Scientific Understanding of Carcinogenesis
The basic characteristic of the group of diseases called cancer34 is
the uncontrolled growth of cells.3 5 Although much has been learned
about the medical aspects of this phenomenon, the etiology of cancer
remains largely unknown. 36 Given this limited understanding, car-
cinogenesis can be described only in terms of correlations between
the observed incidence of cancer above the background level37 and
exposure to suspected carcinogens.38 Regardless of the strength of this
epidemiological evidence, the actual cause of cancer could be some
other factor, whose correlation with the suspected carcinogen has not
been noticed.3 9 Some of this uncertainty is mitigated by experimental
34. There are three major groupings of cancer: carcinomas, which arise in the epi-
thelia, the cell layers that line the body and the glands; sarcomas, which affect fibrous
tissue and blood vessels and are relatively rare; and leukemias and lymphomas, which
are also rare and arise in the blood-forming cells of the bone marrow and lymph nodes.
J. CAIRNS, CANCER: SCIENCE AND SOCIETY 20-22 (1978). The usual classification, however,
is based on the organ in which the cancer originates. According to this typology, there
are about 200 varieties of cancer. Id. at 22.
35. See id. at 15-33; M. SHIMKIN, SCIENCE AND CANCER 1-5, 45-63, 87-98 (1973).
36. See P. BARTH & H. HUNT, supra note 1, at 84 (causes of cancer process have not been
identified and understood).
37. "Individual human subjects in the population are exposed throughout life to a
number of carcinogens, which may be considered to provide a background of carcinogenic
risk; exposure to any amount of a single carcinogen, 'however small, is regarded as
capable of adding to the total carcinogenic risk." Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion; Environmental Protection Agency; Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare; Food
and Drug Administration; Food Safety and Quality Service, Dep't of Agriculture, Scien-
tific Bases for Identification of Potential Carcinogens and Estimation of Risks, 44 Fed.
Reg. 39,858, 39,876 (1979) [hereinafter cited as IRLG Report].
The term "background level," as used in this Note, refers to the expected incidence of
cancer in the most general population appropriate for use in epidemiological studies of
the particular type of cancer in question. See, e.g., Monson, Effects of Industrial Environ-
inent on Health, 8 ENVT'L L. 663, 677 (1978) (epidemiological data comparing observed
with expected deaths among vinyl chloride workers; "[e]xpected numbers based on pro-
portional mortality ratios for United States white males"); id. at 685 (epidemiological data
comparing observed and expected deaths from cancer among cadmium workers; "[e]x-
pected numbers based on incidence rates from the Birmingham (England) Regional
Cancer Registry"); Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46
FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 964-65 (1978) (adenocarcinoma of vagina and uterus infrequently
reported in female population prior to widespread use of DES).
38. See Monson, supra note 37, at 670 (epidemiological studies permit comparison of
cancer incidence in population exposed to suspected carcinogen with incidence in control
population).
39. See CEQ ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 26 (epidemiological studies can seldom
isolate single variables for study because of "complex mix of chemical agents to which
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testing of chemicals on animals under controlled laboratory condi-
tions. 40 Although these tests may help to isolate the experimental
agent responsible for the observed incidence of cancer,41 their results
are still expressed as correlations between the experimental agent and
cancer incidence.42
Moreover, the relationship between the magnitude and duration of
exposure to a carcinogen and the likelihood of contracting cancer
must be inferred from indirect evidence. This relationship is investi-
gated by exposing laboratory animals to high levels of the carcino-
gen. 43 From the results of such experiments, human reactions to the
carcinogen are predicted by the construction of dose-response curves,
statistical models derived from observed correlations between known
dosages and subsequent increases in the incidence of cancer.44 The
extrapolations contained in dose-response curves permit the effects of
exposure levels much lower than those used in the laboratory to be
humans are exposed"); S. EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 40 (major difficulty of epidemiological
studies is separating relevant from irrelevant factors and controlling for "unknown and
unsuspected risk factors" that might otherwise be discounted or overlooked).
40. See Leape, supra note 8, at 93 n.44 ("[A]nimal bioassay is a laboratory procedure
in which the scientists administer the test substance to one group of animals and com-
pares [sic] their cancer incidence, or other response, to that of a 'control' group which has
not been exposed to the substance.') See generally IRLG Report, supra note 37, at
59,862-69 (describing and evaluating bioassay research techniques).
41. See Leape, supra note 8, at 93; cf. IRLG Report, supra note 37, at 39,862-63
(specifying conditions under which test substance can be isolated as experimental variable
in bioassay studies). Bioassay has other advantages as well. Latency periods ranging from
five to forty years in humans are -reduced to one to two years in the naturally short-
lived laboratory animals used in bioassay. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, Identification, Classification and Regulation of Toxic Sub-
stances Posing a Potential Occupational Carcinogenic Risk, 42 Fed. Reg. 54,148, 54,157
(1977). Also, animals can be exposed to carcinogens in much higher dosages than humans
commonly receive "to provide maximum detectability of carcinogenic effects within the
already narrow confines of test sensitivity." IRLG Report, supra note 37, at 39,864.
42. See S. EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 65.
43. See Bates, Laboratory Approaches to the Identification of Carcinogens, 271 ANNALS
N.Y. AcAD. Scm. 29, 50-52 (1976) (exposure of animals to high levels of suspected carcinogen
is necessary because it is impractical to expose sufficient number of test animals to low
dosages of suspected carcinogen to achieve statistically significant result). Critics frequently
question the significance of laboratory test results based on high-level exposure to a
suspected carcinogen. See S. EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 1-2 (public surprised and outraged
by FDA decision to ban saccharin based on bioassays using extremely high doses). Never-
theless, the carcinogenic quality of a substance is independent of the level of exposure.
See Council on Environmental Quality, Toxic Substances Strategy Committee Report to
the President, 44 Fed. Reg. 48,134, 48,159 (1979) [hereinafter cited as CEQ Report to the
President]; S. EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 52 ("The bottom line on carcinogenesis testing
is this. You can drown an animal in a pool of some substance, suffocate an animal under
a heap of it, or beat an animal to death with a sock full of it, but if it isn't car-
cinogenic, you can't give an animal cancer with it.') (quoting W. Hines and J. Randal,
Washington journalists).
44. See IRLG Report, supra note 37, at 59,872-73 (describing procedures for construct-
ing dose-response curves from experimental data).
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estimated. These predictions, however, rely on two empirical assump-
tions: they assume that human beings and experimental animals re-
spond comparably to the particular carcinogen,4 5 and that the re-
sponses observed under large laboratory dosages can be used to predict
responses to the much smaller dosages that human beings are likely
to encounter.
46
Despite these limitations, there is scientific agreement on a few
key issues. There is agreement that most cancers result from exposure
to environmental factors.47 In addition, scientists generally agree that
there is no safe level of exposure to carcinogens, 48 and that there is
45. See id. at 39,875 (close qualitative similarities observed in human and animal re-
sponses to carcinogens). The responses are comparable at least to the extent that all
human carcinogens, with the exception of arsenic, have been found to cause cancer in
animals. Karstadt, supra note 16, at 50,168. In addition, a number of models have been
developed for translating animal response data into quantitative predictions of human
response. See IRLG Report, supra note 37, at 39,875-76.
46. This extrapolation requires some explicit theory describing the relationship be-
tween cancer incidence and exposure to the suspected carcinogen over the relevant range
of dosages. See p. 851 infra (linear relationship believed to exist between dosage and
cancer incidence). To extrapolate from high level animal exposures, it is also necessary
to assume that substances capable of causing cancer in large dosages are carcinogenic in
very small amounts.
47. See P. BARTH & H. HUwr, supra note 1, at 84 (environmental phenomena cause
most cancers); Doniger, supra note 1, at 509 (exposure to chemical substances in environ-
ment causes most cancers).
48. See Karstadt, supra note 16, at 50,174 (majority of cancer researchers conclude that
only zero exposure to carcinogenic chemical should be considered safe for humans). But
see Pelham, Government Tackles Tricky Question of How to Regulate Carcinogens, 36
CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 957, 962-63 (1978) (industry objects to no-threshold view and
insists upon "socially acceptable or permissible exposure levels'). Even if safe levels of
exposure exist in theory, these levels cannot be adequately determined because of un-
certainties in dose-response relationships, variability in susceptibility to cancer, and un-
predictable interactions among cancer-causing agents. See CEQ Report to the President,
suPra note 43, at 38,139-40 (each human exposure to carcinogen adds to total carcino-
genic risk); IRLG Report, supra note 37, at 39,876 ("The self-replicating nature of cancer,
the multiplicity of causative factors to which individuals can be exposed, the additive
and possibly synergistic combination of effects, and the wide range of individual sus-
ceptibilities [make it] currently unreliable to predict a threshold below which human popu-
lation exposure to a carcinogen has no effect on cancer risk.'); Leape, supra note 8, at
101 n.l16 (because no agent induces form of cancer that does not occur in absence of agent,
there is no threshold). As a consequence, federal agencies have assumed, as a matter of
policy, that there is no safe level of exposure to carcinogens. See Environmental Protection
Agency, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Policy and Proce-
dures for Identifying, Assessing, and Regulating Airborne Substances Posing a Risk of
Cancer, 44 Fed. Reg. 58,642, 58,644-45 (1979). Policies based on this assumption have
been upheld by the courts. See Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Administration, 509 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1975) (OSHA permitted to reduce
permissible level of vinyl chloride to "lowest detectable level" because no evidence could
be produced to identify safe levels of exposure due to deficiencies in existing methodology
and research); Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474-75 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(OSHA permitted to set asbestos standards at lowest level feasible to protect workers
from health impairment because insufficient data currently available to predict health
effects of various levels of exposure to asbestos dust).
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a linear relationship between the degree of exposure and the likeli-
hood of contracting cancer.49 By relying on these generalizations, it is
possible to conclude that increased exposure to a particular carcino-
gen will result in an estimable increase in cancer incidence above
the background level for the general population."0 Despite the pre-
dictive force of this conclusion, however, courts, in denying relief to
cancer victims, continue to focus on the limitations of scientific un-
derstanding of carcinogenesis. 51
B. Why Tort Actions for Cancer Fail
To establish tort liability, a plaintiff must prove three elements:
tortious conduct, injury, and proximate cause.52 If the plaintiff has
cancer, she has obviously suffered injury. The failure to establish
either or both of the other two elements, however, frequently stands
in the way of tort recovery by the cancer victim.
1. Tortious Conduct
In the typical tort case, the tortious conduct and the resulting in-
jury are contemporaneous. The plaintiff can immediately gather all
the available evidence and preserve it for trial. In cancer actions, how-
ever, symptoms of the disease commonly appear many years after ex-
posure,5 3 long after important evidence has been lost or destroyed.
49. See IRLG Report, supra note 87, at 39,871 ("The linear . . .dose-response model
appears to have the soundest scientific basis and is less likely to understate risk
than other plausible models.'); Crump, Hoel, Langley, & Peto, Fundamental Carcino-
genic Processes and Their Implications for Low Dose Risk Assessment, 36 CANCER RESEARCH
2973, 2979 (1976) ("[L]inear dose-response relationships are likely to be approximately cor-
rect for many environmental carcinogens . .. .'); cf. Cornfield, Carcinogenic Risk Assess-
ment, 198 Scr. 693, 695-96 (1977) (although scientific arguments supporting linear model
are less than conclusive, model is supported by policy considerations).
50. See, e.g., Monson, supra note 37, at 675-98 (data on occupational groups indicate
increased cancers above background level due to exposure to occupational carcinogens).
But see Maugh, Chemical Carcinogens: How Dangerous Are Low Doses? 202 Sci. 37, 41(constructing dose-response curves from existing data is difficult). See generally IRLG
Report, supra note 37 (describing specific guidelines for carcinogenic risk assessment re-
lating excess cancer incidence to exposures, based on observed and experimental data).
51. See, e.g., Miller v. National Cabinet Co., 8 N.Y.2d 277, 288, 168 N.E.2d 811, 817,
204 N.Y.S.2d 129, 137 (1960) (connection between benzene and leukemia "too conjectural"
to support workers' compensation award); Garner v. Hecla Mining Co., 19 Utah 2d 367,
371, 431 P.2d 794, 797 (1967) (affirming denial of benefits to heirs of uranium miner
who died of lung cancer, citing statistical nature of plaintiff's case and "well-known but
unfortunate uncertainty as to the cause of cancer").
52. See W. PROSSER, suPra note 28, at 143 (elements of negligence cause of action are
duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, and injury). This Note uses the single term
"tortious conduct," rather than "duty" and "breach of duty," to denote conduct that
creates liability, whether the cause of action lies in intentional tort, negligence, or strict
liability.
53. See J. CAIRNs, supra note 34, at 144 (cancer often does not appear until 7 to 20
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Evidentiary problems complicate the plaintiff's case in two ways.
First, it is sometimes difficult for the plaintiff to prove that she was
exposed to a carcinogen or to establish the magnitude of her ex-
posure. Many actions for occupational cancer, for example, have failed
because the plaintiffs were unable to prove the magnitude of exposures
they had received years earlier.5 4 Solutions for this problem lie out-
side the tort system.55 Second, it is often difficult for the plaintiff to
identify, with any certainty, the particular defendant who caused the
exposure. For example, years after consuming a prescribed drug, plain-
tiffs have been unable to identify the particular brand or its manu-
facturer.56 Thus, the element of tortious conduct is a significant ob-
stacle to the cancer victim suing in tort. Nevertheless, it is not an
unreasonable burden from either a doctrinal or a practical perspective.
Although both the compensation and the deterrence objectives of
tort law can be achieved without identifying the specific tortfeasor,
deterrence does require at least that the plaintiff identify the right
class of defendants.5 7 Unless compensation is exacted from the class of
years after exposure to carcinogen). The difficulty in proving causation as a result of an
extended latency period is not unique to cancer torts. Cf. Note, Compensating Victims
of Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L. REv. 916, 921-22 (1980) (workers less likely to be
compensated for job-related illness than for injury due to job-related accident).
54. See, e.g., Parker v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 440 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1969) (deny-
ing recovery to radiation victim whose radiation measuring device measured inaccurately
and who wore no device for two years).
55. Adequate recordkeeping requirements should be developed to fill an important
gap in current regulatory efforts. OSHA has promulgated regulations requiring employers
to keep records on work-related injuries and illnesses. See [1979] 41 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
& HEALTH REP. (BNA) 2111 (Ref. File) (describing recordkeeping requirements). But these
regulations do not require employers to maintain, in the absence of a demonstrated hazard,
long-term employment records that would reveal the chemicals to which workers have
been exposed. Hence, currently available data are clearly inadequate to reconstruct the
epidemiology of occupational cancers with long latency periods. See S. EPSTEIN, supra
note 6, at 368. Moreover, workers generally do not have the right to know the identity
and nature of health hazards to which they are exposed in the workplace. NEW YORK
AcADEMY OF ScIENcEs, CANCER AND THE WORKER 76 (1977). This information should be
available to workers because, without it, workers are unable to protect themselves from
hazards or to ensure that health regulations are enforced.
56. See, e.g., Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (granting
summary judgment in favor of codefendant DES manufacturer on ground that plaintiff
failed to identify codefendant as manufacturer of DES that her mother had ingested
during pregnancy). In 1978, between 80 and 100 cases were pending in the United States
against manufacturers of DES, a carcinogenic, man-made estrogen used by millions of
pregnant women between 1947 and 1971. Comment, supra note 37, at 963-67. In the first
case to go to trial, Barros v. E.R. Squibb & Co., No. 75-1226 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1978),
the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, indicating in a special verdict that plaintiff
had not proven that her mother had used Squibb's product. Comment, supra note 37,
at 967-68.
57. See Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts, 43 U. CH. L. Rxv. 69, 81
(1975) (proximity of defendants to injury is useful in deciding which causally linked
activities should be controlled, because proximate cause examines "relative susceptibility
of various actions to modifications diminishing their riskiness"). Professor Calabresi ar-
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defendants whose emissions of carcinogens can be influenced by po-
tential liability, there will be no deterrent effect, and only further
inefficiencies will result. Once the plaintiff has identified the right
class, courts can apply one of three theories-alternative liability58
enterprise liability, 9 and market share liability6 -to shift the bur-
den of identifying the specific tortfeasor to the class of defendants.
Those defendants in the class who can show that they could not have
caused the injury may be dismissed from the action, 61 leaving an ap-
propriate class of defendants to share the liability.
2. Proximate Cause
The current limitations of scientific knowledge about the causes
of cancer create three major problems for plaintiffs attempting to
prove proximate cause in cancer suits. First, courts frequently dismiss
cases on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to establish that the
suspected carcinogen was capable of causing the cancer.6 2 Second,
gues that general deterrence and accident cost minimization goals are furthered by allo-
cating costs to the class of "cheapest cost avoiders," instead of letting them remain with
the victim. G. CALAREs, supra note 7, at 261-62. Professor Fletcher would control the
disproportionate distribution of risk by allocating costs of risk to the class of risk-
creators who raise hazards above the background level. Fletcher, supra note 29, at 550-51.
58. Alternative liability is the imposition of liability on two or more defendants when
all were at fault but only one or a few caused plaintiff's injury and there is no way of
determining which defendant caused the injury. W. PRossER, supra note 28, at 243; see,
e.g., Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86, 88, 199 P.2d 1, 4-5 (1948) (shifting burden of
proof to negligent defendants because plaintiff could not show which defendant caused
injury); Cook v. Lewis, [1952] 1 D.L.R. 1 (1951) (jury should have found both negligent
defendants liable).
59. Enterprise liability holds all members of an industry liable for the injury caused
by the product of one if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the tortious conduct was
part of a concerted action by the defendants and if, through no fault of the plaintiff, there
is no way to determine which defendant's product caused the injury. See, e.g., Hall v.
E.l. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (refusing to dismiss
suit against six major manufacturers of blasting caps by children injured in 12 separate
explosions).
60. The market share theory imposes alternative liability on manufacturers when
there are so many possible defendants that it would be impractical to sue them all.
Under this theory the defendants need represent only a substantial percentage of the
market, and each is held liable only for a percentage of the judgment equal to its share
of the market. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d
924, 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 145, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980) (cancer victim per-
mitted to sue 6 of 200 DES manufacturers because 6 defendants constituted 90% of
market).
61. See, e.g., id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145 (defendant in DES case
avoided liability by showing that it was not manufacturing DES at time plaintiff's mother
was using drug).
62. See, e.g., Miller v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 398 S.W.2d 472, 473 (Ky. 1965)
(proposition that various organic chemicals cause leukemia is "too speculative" to support
workers' compensation award); Miller v. National Cabinet Co., 8 N.Y.2d 277, 288-90, 168
N.E.2d 811, 817-18, 204 N.Y.S.2d 129, 137-39 (1960) (plaintiff failed to establish causal
relationship between benzene and leukemia).
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even if the plaintiff succeeds in such a proof, courts may refuse to
find proximate cause on the ground that the plaintiff's exposure to
the substance was not of "a sufficient amount. .. to do bodily harm."0' 3
In other words, many courts assume, contrary to current scientific un-
derstanding, 64 that there is a safe threshold level of exposure to car-
cinogens. Third, even if the court is persuaded that the plaintiff was
exposed to a sufficient amount of a carcinogen, it may deny relief be-
cause the plaintiff cannot prove that her cancer was caused by that
particular exposure.65
These difficulties in establishing proximate cause stem from the
courts' refusal to accept scientific evidence about carcinogenesis as
legal evidence of causation. Cancer victims should not be precluded
from recovering for their injuries solely because carcinogenesis is de-
scribed by a statistical correlation rather than by a cause-and-effect
mechanism. Rather, the statistical correlation should be incorporated
into the causation requirement so that the tort mechanism can ef-
fectively deter carcinogen production and prevent future cancer in-
cidence.66 It is a statistical certainty that producers of carcinogens are
63. Mahoney v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 823, 841 (E.D. Tenn. 1963) (exposures to
radiation or toxic gases held insufficient to cause leukemia or Hodgkin's disease); accord,
Clark v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 155 W. Va. 726, 731-32, 187 S.E.2d
213, 216 (1972) (four exposures to carcinogens held not sufficient to produce toxic
influence).
64. See p. 850 supra (no safe threshold of exposure).
65. See, e.g., Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 22-23 (5th Cir. 1965)
(affirming jury verdict that plaintiff had failed to prove that his lung cancer was spe-
cifically attributable to smoking); Garner v. Hecla Mining Co., 19 Utah 2d 367, 371,
431 P.2d 794, 797 (1967) (affirming denial of benefits to heirs of uranium mine worker
who died of lung cancer, citing statistical nature of plaintiffs' case).
66. This Note adopts an instrumental, rather than a moralistic, theory of causation.
Sec note 29 supra. Under this theory, causal requirements in a tort action for cancer
would be fulfilled if the assessment of liability based on a finding of causation would
further the objective of deterring carcinogen production and preventing cancer inci-
dence. According to Professor Calabresi,
Causal requirements, like all other legal requirements, must ultimately justify
themselves in functional terms ....
In this sense many seemingly significant philosophical questions concerning cause
become irrelevant to the use of that term in law. To amplify: so far as legal lan-
guage is concerned, the "cause" of a disease would depend on how, at any given
time, it could be most easily controlled.
Calabresi, supra note 57, at 105.
Professor Borgo provides an elaboration of Calabresi's instrumental conception of cau.
sation that is useful in considering legal problems of carcinogenesis:
A type of conduct is causally linked to a type of harm when an increase in the
frequency with which conduct of that type is performed leads to an increase in the
frequency with which harm of that type occurs ....
. . . To say that smoking is causally linked to lung cancer is to say that an
increase in the performance of that conduct alone will cause a greater incidence
of lung cancer. And this is true even if more than one type of conduct is causally
linked to the same type of harm. The fact that the incidence of lung cancer is
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increasing the incidence of cancer in the general population. The
mere fact that the etiology of the injuries is complex should not shield
those producers from legal responsibility.
III. Standards of Proof in Tort Actions for Cancer
Defendants' current advantage in suits brought by cancer victims
should be eliminated by translating scientific understanding of car-
cinogenesis into a form that will facilitate proof of proximate cause.
A catalog of carcinogenic substances and their dose-response curves 7
should be compiled by a federal agency and then adopted into law
by state legislatures. Once a cancer victim has demonstrated that she
has been exposed by the defendant to some threshold amount of a
listed carcinogen, the burden of proof should shift to the defendant
to prove that the exposure was not the cause of the plaintiff's cancer.
A. Conditions for Shifting the Burden of Proof of Causation
Congress should require an existing agency to construct and main-
tain, based on the best available scientific information, a catalog of
carcinogenic substances and their dose-response curves.68 Agency de-
terminations of whether to list a substance should be made accord-
ing to established priorities69 and pursuant to strict standards for the
determined by both smoking and, say, coal mining is consistent with the fact that
an increase in smoking will cause the incidence to rise.
Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J. LECAL STUD. 419, 424 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
This instrumental notion of causation, at one extreme of modern tort theory, has been
termed the "radical functional approach," as distinguished from the traditional approach
represented by Professors Epstein and Fletcher. The traditionalist approach is founded
upon the concept of corrective justice: that is, upon the notion that when one man
harms another the victim has a moral right to demand, and the injurer a moral
duty to pay to him, compensation for the harm . . . . This obligation arises from
the causal relation between the injurer's conduct and the victim's harm.
Borgo, supra, at 419-20.
Despite the difference in theory, both approaches recognize that liability can be im-
posed on producers of carcinogens. See note 29 supra. They differ in the importance
they place on demonstrating the existence of a specific causal connection between a
plaintiff's injury and a particular producer's tortious conduct. See also Borgo, supra, at
453-54 (discussing other differences between approaches).
67. See p. 849 supra (defining dose-response curves).
68. Any of the six federal agencies that are responsible for regulating carcinogens, see
note 6 supra, has sufficient technical expertise to implement this proposal. Because the
proposal is not restricted to a generic subset of carcinogens, the agency experienced with
the widest range of carcinogens-the Environmental Protection Agency or the Food and
Drug Administration-would probably be the most appropriate choice.
69. A schedule for evaluating substrnces for possible listing in the catalog should be
established to discourage lobbying efforts by industries with interests in delaying decisions
on particular substances. For an example of such priority-setting, see Consumer Product
Safety Commission, Classifying, Evaluating, and Regulating Carcinogens in Consumer
The Yale Law Journal
evaluation of cancer research.70 These determinations should be made
without reference to economic consequences that might flow from the
identification of a substance as a carcinogen.71 The catalog should
be promulgated by the federal agency in formal rulemaking proce-
dures.72 The process-rigorous scientific study followed by almost cer-
tain challenge before the agency and in the courts-would necessarily
be long and costly. In the long run, however, it would be more ef-
ficient to determine the carcinogenicity of a substance in one com-
prehensive proceeding than to litigate it repeatedly in individual tort
suits. 73
Products, 43 Fed. Reg. 25,657, 25,660-61 (1978) (proposal by CPSC that priorities for
regulation of products containing carcinogens be set according to estimate of risk posed
by each substance).
70. A consensus on cancer research standards has been developed by a consortium
of federal agencies, the Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group, acting under an inter-
agency agreement. Environmental Protection Agency, Regulation of Toxic and Hazardous
Substances, 42 Fed. Reg. 54,856 (1977). These agencies recently published a report con-
taining a detailed evaluation of scientific methodologies used to assess carcinogenic risk.
See IRLG Report, supra note 37.
71. A major premise of this proposal is that carcinogens will be produced at a so-
cially optimal level if producers of carcinogens are required to internalize the full social
costs of their activities. In order to communicate accurate information to producers about
the costs of their cancer-causing activities, the scientific determination of carcinogenicity
must be made without regard to the economic consequences of such a determination.
72. The agency would be bound by the "on the record" rulemaking requirements of
the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556-557 (1976). The evidentiary record
compiled before the agency would be subject to judicial review under a "substantial
evidence test." Id. § 706(2)(E). Traditional standards for judicial review of administrative
procedures would require that the agency prepare a full record before it reaches a
determination of carcinogenicity. The agency, however, would have substantial discre-
tion in arriving at a decision. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543-45, 558 (1978) (absent constitutional con-
straints and barring extremely compelling circumstances, administrative rulings should
not be overturned if agency meets minimum procedural requirements); Federal Power
Comm'n v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326, 331-33 (1976) (agency de-
cisions may be remanded for inadequate record, but courts should normally defer to
agency's "administrative discretion').
Courts have been particularly deferential to agency determinations in scientifically un-
certain areas such as carcinogen regulation. See Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499
F.2d 467, 474 & n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (promulgation of standards "on the frontiers of
scientific knowledge" necessarily requires that agency be afforded "broad discretion to
attempt to formulate a solution to the best of its ability on the basis of available in-
formation"); cf. Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Adminis-
tration, 509 F.2d 1301, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (act requires that protection be provided to
workers "even in circumstances where existing methodology or research is deficient").
73. Administrative findings of fact would be substantially secure from judicial reversal
unless the underlying record developed by the agency is inadequate. See note 72 sutra.
By precluding litigation in tort cases on the factual questions of carcinogenicity and dose-
response curves, the proposal would centralize the fact-finding process and open it for
public participation. By minimizing the overall transaction costs of participants in the
decisionmaking, the proposal would assure more efficient and comprehensive consideration
of the issues involved than would a more decentralized approach. See F. ANDERSON, supnra
note 17, at 186-89 ("publicness and centralization" in environmental decisionmaking will
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State legislatures should then incorporate the catalog into state tort
law.7 4 State legislation should create two presumptions that would
apply in tort actions for cancer: a conclusive presumption that any
substance listed in the catalog is capable of causing cancer in human
beings and a rebuttable presumption that a plaintiff's exposure to any
of the listed substances was the cause in fact of her cancer.75 This
second presumption would be triggered when the plaintiff shows, by
means of the cataloged dose-response curve, that the amount of ex-
posure to a listed carcinogen exceeded a given threshold.70 The thresh-
old should be set at a level greater than double the background rate;
that is, any exposure that more than doubled the probability of the
plaintiff's developing cancer would exceed the threshold.77
evoke better information and result in more appropriate standards than present environ-
mental policy); Caruso, Industry Responsibility for Environmentally Caused Cancer Un-
der the Toxic Substances Control Act, 7 J. COMPUTERS, TECH. & L. 213, 225 (1979) (OSHA
has concluded that adopting general cancer policies through rulemaking would preclude
challenges to policy in subsequent individual hearings on particular substances).
74. It is unlikely that all, or even most, states will adopt this proposal at once. The
first few states to do so could serve as laboratories, allowing legislatures of other states
to observe the results of early attempts. A Uniform Carcinogenic Torts Act might en-
courage some reluctant states to enact appropriate legislation and might help to foster
uniform treatment of cancer suits.
75. Legislative imposition of presumptions of this sort is common in the context of
occupational disease. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 921(c) (Supp. I1 1979) (establishing rebuttable
presumptions that pneumoconiosis-black lung disease-arose out of employment if miner
was employed in one or more mines for 10 years or more, and that "if a deceased miner
was employed for ten years or more in one or more coal mines and died from a respirable
disease . . . his death was due to pneumoconiosis'); N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAw § 47(McKinney 1965) (presumption that worker who develops any of several specified diseases
during or after involvement in certain activities contracted disease as result of his
employment).
Legislation creating presumptions that apply in judicial proceedings has been com-
monly upheld against constitutional challenge. See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining
Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding constitutionality of presumptions created by Black Lung
Benefits Act); Mobile, J. & K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910) (presumption
mandated by legislature does not violate due process or equal protection if rational con-
nection exists between fact proved and ultimate fact presumed, and if inference of one
fact from proof of another is not so unreasonable as to be purely arbitrary).
76. This threshold applies to evidence of exposure to carcinogens. It is designed to
eliminate plaintiffs who cannot meet traditional tort standards of proof. Thus, this
threshold imposes a legal standard that has no relation to the scientific threshold of
safe exposure, the level below which exposure to a carcinogen will not increase the risk
of developing cancer. See pp. 850-51 supra (scientific threshold).
77. As a matter of probability theory, setting the threshold at this level is equivalent,
under certain simplifying assumptions, to requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate that her
cancer was more probably than not caused by exposure to the defendant's carcinogen.
At the outset, in the absence of more particularized evidence, there are only two possible
causes of the plaintiff's cancer: either the cancer resulted from those processes that gen-
erate the background incidence of cancer in the general population, or it resulted from
the demonstrated exposure to the defendant's carcinogen. By hypothesis, the prospective
probability of developing cancer from each of these causes is known: the background
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Once the plaintiff has made a threshold showing, and has proved
that the defendant was responsible for the exposure, the burden should
shift to the defendant to rebut the presumption of causation. By in-
troducing evidence of the plaintiff's exposure to other carcinogens,
the defendant could show that exposure to their carcinogen was not
the most likely cause of the plaintiff's cancer.78 Alternatively, the
defendant could join other defendants-producers who had exposed
incidence is simply the probability that any member of the general population will de-
velop cancer, and the dose-response curves state the increase in likelihood, above the
background probability, that the plaintiff will develop cancer given the level of her
exposure to the defendant's carcinogen.
Once the plaintiff has developed cancer, determination of the cause requires a de-
termination that one of the two possible causes was more probably responsible. To find
the defendant responsible for the plaintiff's cancer is to find that the retrospective prob-
ability that exposure to the defendant's carcinogen was the cause is greater than one-half.
Cf. Kaye, Probability Theory Meets Res Ipsa Loquitur, 77 MICH. L. Rav. 1456 (1979)
(applying similar analysis to describe factual assumptions subsumed in doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur).
If the plaintiff meets the threshold quantity of exposure required by the proposal, the
prospective probability of developing cancer from the defendant's carcinogen would be
greater than the background incidence. As a result, the retrospective probability would
indicate that the cancer, more probably than not, resulted from the defendant's carcino-
gen. Under the proposal, the burden would be shifted to the defendant to supply evi-
dence tending to undercut the presumption.
The relationships between prospective and retrospective probabilities assumed above
are mathematically correct only under certain simplifying assumptions. For example, the
fact that the potency of a carcinogen may be altered by interactions with other car-
cinogens violates the mathematical assumption that the two prospective causes of cancer
are statistically independent. Moreover, the population whose cancer incidence is de-
scribed by the dose-response curve is a subset of the general population used to establish
background cancer incidence. Nevertheless, the danger of cancer to the public health
justifies the use of these simplifying assumptions to further long-term prevention ob-
jectives, despite the absence of definitive scientific knowledge about these difficult
factual questions.
78. See, e.g., Braden v. City of Hialeah, 177 So. 2d 235, 236 (Fla. 1965) (affirming
denial of benefits because medical testimony did not exclude possibility that petitioner's
pigmentation made her more susceptible to skin cancer or that she would not have de-
veloped cancer if she was not lifeguard); Garner v. Hecla Mining Co., 19 Utah 2d 367,
871, 431 P.2d 794, 797 (1967) (affirming denial of benefits to uranium mine worker who
died of lung cancer, because evidence, including fact that decedent had been habitual
cigarette smoker, was insufficient to prove that exposure by last employer had caused
cancer); Olson v. Federal Am. Partners, 567 P.2d 710, 712-13 (Wyo. 1977) (evidence, in.
cluding fact that decedent had been habitual cigarette smoker, insufficient to prove
exposure by employer caused cancer).
These cases, relying upon demonstrations of cause-and-effect to establish liability, might
well have resulted in different outcomes under a causation rule that focused on the
increment to the plaintiff's risk of contracting cancer from exposure to the defendant's
carcinogen. For example, if the defendant establishes that the plaintiff was exposed to
another carcinogen, one that reacted synergistically with the defendant's carcinogen, the
question would still remain as to who is legally responsible for the synergistic increment
to the plaintiff's risk resulting from exposure to both carcinogens. If it is the defendant,
then introducing evidence of the previous exposure will increase, rather than decrease,
the increment for which the defendant is responsible.
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plaintiff to the same carcinogen or other carcinogens-in order to shift
or share liability.79
State adoption of the catalog and the presumptions should not pre-
clude a plaintiff from bringing a conventional tort action. 0 Thus, a
plaintiff could attempt to demonstrate in court that her cancer re-
sulted from exposure to a substance not listed in the catalog. Simi-
larly, if the plaintiff was exposed to a cataloged carcinogen, but that
exposure was not sufficient to meet the threshold, the plaintiff could
still attempt to prove causation.81 In both of these cases, of course,
the burden of proof would remain with the plaintiff.
B. Impact of the Proposal
The proposed catalog and judicial presumptions would overcome
the advantage currently enjoyed by defendants in cancer actions.
Cancer victims who could demonstrate significant exposures to car-
cinogenic substances would no longer be denied compensation be-
cause of science's limited ability to describe the etiology of cancer. The
proposal would force producers to internalize the actual social costs
of their activities, thereby providing an incentive for producers to
reduce their emissions of carcinogens to socially optimal levels.
Not all producers of carcinogens would be equally affected under
this proposal. Initially, a plaintiff would have to demonstrate that
she had been exposed to a carcinogen. The proposal therefore would
have its greatest impact in easily verifiable instances of exposure-
routine exposures over long periods of time, such as those that occur
79. See Smoking, Not Asbestos, Caused Disease, Firm Claims in Suing Tobacco Com-
panies, [1980] 10 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 463 (defendant asbestos
company cross-claimed against six tobacco companies, alleging that smoking, not asbestos,
caused plaintiffs' cancers).
80. The insufficiency of evidence to warrant listing a substance should not preclude a
plaintiff from attempting to demonstrate that a substance is carcinogenic. First, although
bioassay and epidemiology can demonstrate carcinogenicity with a high degree of accuracy,
they cannot exonerate a substance. IRLG Report, supra note 37, at 39,871. Second, the
administrative determination of carcinogenicity would be a very lengthy process. Cancer
victims should not be barred from bringing suit simply because the agency has not yet
made determinations on the substances to which they were exposed. Third, many sub-
stances are not suspected to be carcinogens until patterns of incidence emerge. Re-
stricting cancer suits to cataloged substances would discriminate against cancer victims
exposed to substances recently discovered to be carcinogenic.
81. A plaintiff would be most likely to succeed if the cancer were a "marker tumor,"
that is, if it could be caused only by a particular chemical. Angiosarcoma of the liver,
for example, is caused only by exposure to vinyl chloride. A plaintiff's exposure to vinyl
chloride may have been only large enough to increase her prospective probability of
developing angiosarcoma of the liver by 50%. Nevertheless, the plaintiff might well con-
vince a jury that her cancer resulted from that exposure, provided she was not exposed
to significant amounts of vinyl chloride from any other source.
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in the workplace or those that are due to environmental contamina-
tion;2 massive exposures, such as those that result from disasters;8 3
and products liability cases.8 4 By contrast, the proposal would have
less impact on carcinogenic activities that result in exposures of
relatively minor magnitude, duration, or potency. For example, the evi-
dence that saccharin causes cancer in laboratory animals 5 would trig-
ger the conclusive presumption of carcinogenicity. Occasional con-
sumption of low-calorie soft drinks, however, would be unlikely to
reach the threshold of exposure required to activate the proposal's
presumption of causation. 6 Similarly, the presumption of causation
would not be triggered if there were no evidence of the magnitude
82. Environmental contamination often goes unnoticed, but when it is discovered its
presence and its effects are relatively easy to document. See, e.g., Brown, Love Canal,
U.S.A., N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1979, § 6 (Magazine), at 23 (describing contamination by
toxic and carcinogenic wastes of Niagara Falls, N.Y., neighborhood). Once occupational
hazards are recognized, they can be documented. See, e.g., P. BaRTH & H. HUNT, supra
note 1, at 15-60 (describing incidence of workers' exposure to carcinogenic and toxic sub-
stances). But cf. note 55 supra (lack of recordkeeping requirements hinders identification
of source of occupational disease).
83. Accidents that expose individuals to carcinogenic substances will frequently be
sufficiently manifest to alert potential plaintiffs to collect evidence long before symptoms
arise. See, e.g., Experts Monitoring Radiation's Effects, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1979, § 1, at
25 (scientists gathering data on effects of radiation leakage at Three Mile Island).
84. Although the fungibility of different producers' products often makes it difficult
years later to identify the specific manufacturer of an injury-causing product, tort law
in some jurisdictions will permit actions against all or most of the members of the
relevant industry. See, e.g., Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (allowing suit against all domestic manufacturers of blasting caps by
children injured by unidentified caps); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588,
607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980) (plaintiff cancer
victim permitted to sue 6 of 200 manufacturers of DES on ground that 6 represented
90% of market).
85. See Coca-Cola Co., Tab Bottle Label (Conn. ed. 5-cent refund) ("[T]his product
contains saccharin which has been determined to cause cancer in laboratory animals.");
S. REP. No. 95-353, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3921, 3924-26 (summarizing evidence leading to passage of Saccharin Study and
Labeling Act, Pub. L. No. 95-203, § 4, 91 Stat. 1451 (1977) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343
(Supp. III 1979)). See also S. EPsrEIN, supra note 6, at 194-95 (results of laboratory tests
demonstrate that saccharin causes cancer in animals); Smith, NAS Saccharin Report
Sweetens FDA Position, But Not by Much, 202 ScI. 852, 852 (1978) (National Academy
of Sciences report concludes that saccharin poses potential carcinogenic risk to humans,
but fails to resolve political issue of FDA ban on saccharin).
86. The potency of saccharin is relatively low compared to that of other carcinogens;
therefore greater quantities of saccharin exposure are required to induce comparable
numbers of tumors in laboratory animals. See Maugh, Estimating Potency of Carcinogens
Is an Exact Science, 202 Sci. 38 (1978) (comparing quantities of different carcinogens re-
quired to induce cancer in 50% of animals in bioassay study). Ubiquitous carcinogens
of relatively low potency, such as saccharin and other food additives, are more properly
the subject of specific deterrence control mechanisms such as regulation or prohibition.
See Doniger, supra note 1, at 656-57 (per se or no-risk prohibitions are more appropriate
regulations for food additives).
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or frequency of exposure,8 7 or of the fact of exposure.88
By restricting the availability of the presumptions to cases in which
the exposure at least doubled the plaintiff's risk of contracting can-
cer, the proposal would prevent over-deterrence of producers by pro-
tecting defendants from liability for cancers they probably did not
cause.89 At the same time, the presumption would effectively deter
defendants whose activities increased the incidence of cancer by a
statistically substantial amount. To the extent that producers' lia-
bility in tort approximates the actual social costs of their carcinogenic
emissions, those emissions would be reduced to socially optimal levels.
A successfully functioning tort mechanism would also complement
the effectiveness of the regulatory and research efforts in the war on
cancer. The general deterrence effect of tort liability would encourage
carcinogen producers in the private sector to conduct research in can-
cer prevention as part of their efforts to avoid future liability. 0 This
would encourage producers to conduct more systematic evaluations
of the carcinogenic potential of alternative production processes, as
well as general research in the fields of cancer treatment and cure.
A tort remedy would also complement government regulatory ef-
forts by encouraging producers to reduce emissions of carcinogens. 91
Economically rational producers would seek to reduce carcinogenic
emissions in order to minimize their potential tort liability. Conse-
87. Evidence of exposure to a cataloged substance would trigger the conclusive pre-
sumption of carcinogenicity, but not the presumption of causation. Thus, the proposal
would have helped the plaintiff in Garner v. Hecla Mining Co., 19 Utah 2d 367, 370-71,
431 P.2d 794, 796-97 (1967), who failed to persuade the court that exposure to uranium
causes cancer. It would not have helped the plaintiff in Parker v. Employers Mut. Liab.
Ins. Co., 440 SAV.2d 43, 47-48 (rex. 1969), who persuaded the court that exposure to
radioactive materials could cause cancer, but who had no evidence of the extent of
exposure.
88. Without evidence of an exposure, there is no way to assign liability to a defendant.
Cf. pp. 852-53 supra (general deterrence requires identification of right class of defendants).
89. The threshold requirement allows the proposal to approximate the traditional
tort proof standard of "more likely than not." See note 77 suPra (probability theory ex-
planation of threshold requirement). A lower threshold could result in a bandwagon
effect: once a particular defendant has been found to be vulnerable, he could find him-
self sued by many plaintiffs able to demonstrate only a small exposure and whose cancers,
therefore, probably were not caused by that defendant. Liability in such cases would
unduly burden the target defendant while allowing more likely causes of the cancers
to go undeterred.
90. Cf. Spence & Weitzman, supra note 16, at 216 (combination of regulatory and
market approaches to emission reduction would provide incentive for technological growth
that accommodates pollution abatement objectives as well as economic growth).
91. Thus, a carcinogen producer's compliance with regulatory provisions should not
be a defense in tort actions for cancer. Such a defense would undercut the deterrence
function of the tort mechanism, destroying the complementary effect on the regulatory
system. Cf. W. PROSSER, suttra note 28, at 203 (compliance with statute or regulation does
not prove lack of negligence).
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quently, producers would no longer regard the costs of emission con-
trol mandated by government regulation as deadweight losses, and they
would comply with the regulations more willingly. As a consequence,
the enforcement of government regulations would be more effective
and would be achieved at a lower cost to the government.
Conclusion
Existing scientific and regulatory strategies in the war on cancer
do not effectively deter the introduction of carcinogens into the en-
vironment and do not adequately compensate victims. Courts, ap-
plying traditional causation requirements, reject current scientific un-
derstanding of the etiology of cancer as proof of legal causation in
tort suits for cancer, thereby preventing the tort mechanism from per-
forming its deterrence function. The current limitations of the tort
system could be overcome, however, by a shift in the burden of proof
on the issue of proximate cause once a plaintiff has demonstrated a
threshold exposure to a substance listed in a legislatively enacted
catalog of carcinogens. An effective tort system would both compen-
sate victims and deter the production of carcinogens while rendering
more effective the other policy approaches to the cancer problem.
862.
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